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Abstract 
A model is sketched that allows to display the reaction of the supply side in the freight transport market on changes in demand and 
on policy measures. Considerations are made on how to include the concept of monopolistic competition into an agent based market 
simulation. Methods of price formation and rules for entries and exits of suppliers in the market are given.    
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1. Introduction 
Freight transportation requires the interaction of a multitude of actors. This holds true for the relationships between 
shippers and recipients as well as for their business connections with transport companies. However, interactions 
between single actors alone cannot explain the observable movements of heavy goods vehicles, nor can information 
on such movements be traced back to single interactions. Thus, there is an apparent mismatch between observed 
respective observable states in the transport networks and the behavior of single actors involved in freight transport.  
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Research has identified two main reasons for this gap between individual behavior and the behavior of the transport 
system. The first one is the necessity of coordination between the involved companies. On the demand side of the 
freight transport market, companies often do not act independently, as they are part of logistic chains.  These chains 
become more efficient if the involved parties on all chain links collaborate. Collaboration on all chain links means 
that the requirements of all concerned companies are passed on through the chain and that the actions of single 
companies implicitly take the requirements of all other actors into account. Moreover, logistic chains have to adapt to 
requirements from outside. In many cases transport services are performed by a transport company and not by the 
shippers or recipients. Additional outside influences on logistic chains in these cases are the actions taken by transport 
companies.  
The existence of an own business sector for freight transport is the second reason for the gap mentioned above. 
Single transport companies optimize the freight flows of many logistic chains. At the same time, competition on the 
market forces them to operate at the lowest possible costs given the requirements of their customers. For this purpose, 
they maintain networks of facilities to fulfil transport tasks in a competitive way. In particular smaller shipments are 
not suitable to be transferred directly from the shipper to the recipient but rather have to be fed in such networks. 
These networks entail vehicle movements that deviate from the original flows of goods, as such deviations are cost 
minimizing given all the orders handed over to a certain transport company.  
Movements of freight transport vehicles are thus the result of the continuous adaptation of many actors to each 
other. This adaptation goes along with phenomena of emergence that influence the observable traffic flows. Moreover, 
emergent phenomena can lead to changes in the structure of demand and supply on the transport market that are also 
partially observable. One of these changes is the entry and exit of transport companies in a certain market segment. 
We want to address such emergence by composing a transport market of its constituent parts. For these purpose, we 
want to outline an approach to model the interactions between supply and demand on the market for mixed cargo. 
With supply, transport companies are meant that carry shipments on their own account. The demand side is represented 
by shippers and recipients of goods. As decisions are drawn decentralized on such a market, agent based simulation 
will be employed. Agents are to a certain extent heterogeneous, pursue their own goals and adjust to the influences of 
the market. From the behavior of single agents, the market outcome and thus the generation of vehicle movements 
will be put together. A specification for a model to be implemented is sketched in which some aspects on the 
intersection of transport demand modelling and microeconomics will be dealt with. The present paper will outline a 
model for a market under monopolistic competition. The reason for the choice of this market form is that some 
properties of the suppliers, i.e. the transport companies will be explained endogenously by the model.  
2. Literature overview 
There are many scientific disciplines that deal with the interactions of a system and the parts that it is comprised 
of. Many of such interactions have been described quantitatively in natural sciences, such as physics. From there, 
concepts were transferred to social sciences in general and economics in particular (c.f. Weidlich (2006)). In such 
models, single actors take into account the behavior of their environment to varying extents. Models in which actors 
explicitly anticipate the actions of all other players also occur in industrial organization that uses game theoretical 
concepts to study the connection between a market and the firms that are active there.  
Such approaches try to look for solutions in closed form. In more complex settings this is not possible anymore, so 
that it is resorted to simulation models, in which a myriad of possible system states can be displayed in comparatively 
short time. In social sciences, agent based models have been used to address situations in which the state of a collective 
of individuals has to be explained from the decisions that single members of this collective draw. For the special case 
of economic models an own branch of research called Agent Based Computational Economics (ACE) has emerged. 
Tesfatsion (2006, p. 835) states “ACE is the computational study of economic processes modelled as dynamic systems 
of interacting agents”. Agents in the sense of Wooldridge & Jennings (1995) are computer systems that can act 
autonomously to reach a certain predefined goal.  
Models of market simulation have already been applied to transport markets in the past.  One of the first of them 
is the one of Holguin-Veras (2000). Starting from the assumption of Cournot competition between two carriers, vehicle 
tours are built, so that all transport demand can be satisfied and both carriers maximize their profits. Dimitriou and 
Stathopoulos (2009) also model oligopolistic behavior in the competition between three maritime container terminals 
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in the east Mediterranean with each terminal operator trying to attract the profit maximizing share of demand. In their 
model operators can invest money to accelerate transport in the ports and on hinterland links. By means of a co-
evolutionary genetic algorithm, a solution is obtained.  
Competition between various modes and carriers operating on the same freight corridor is modeled by Baindur and 
Viegas (2011). The market for truckload transportation is regulated by the number of active companies which in turn 
depends on the prices that can be charged from the customers. The latter can choose between one of the many active 
road transport companies and an intermodal carrier. 
In the concept that Roorda et al. (2010) propose for an agent based framework for freight transport, markets play a 
crucial role. Agents can interact on markets for commodities, services and logistics, where they make contracts on 
exchanging goods or services for money and on transporting the goods that were exchanged in the corresponding 
purchase contracts. Cavalcante (2013) extends these conceptual considerations and implements the agent based model 
FREMIS. There, parts of the concept are made operational for a transport market in an urban area. Customers select 
carriers according to a logit model and carriers charge prices depending on incremental costs caused by the shipment 
at hand and the intensity of competition. As deep market knowledge is required for implementing a detailed model, 
an extensive survey was conducted in the Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area. 
A fundamental problem of price calculation is that not all customer orders are known at the beginning of the 
planning horizon. Offers made to customers have to anticipate the quantities of future demand. In the freight transport 
business, this context dependence of costs is more pronounced as temporal and spatial aspects are added. Costs caused 
by empty trips and idle times have to be quantified and covered by total revenue.  Mes (2008) deals with this problem 
for a company in the full truckload business. He introduces day plans for the vehicles similar to the ones for people in 
passenger transport. In these plans, incoming orders are inserted subject to spatial and temporal constraints in order to 
calculate costs and prices. Figliozzi (2004) also deals with the problem of dynamically assigning incoming orders to 
vehicles that are already deployed to serve customers. He examines various learning techniques of carriers that 
compete for a certain shipment in an auction. 
Krajewska and Kopfer (2009) deal with the decision of a freight forwarder to either operate vehicles on his own or 
to hand the shipments over to a transport company.  A tabu search algorithm is applied to let the forwarder decide to 
give shipments to own vehicles or to choose one of several pre-defined subcontractors.  
In freight market models, the prevailing market structure is oligopolistic competition in several shapes (e.g. Lee et. 
al. (2014), Nagurney (2010), Adler (2005)). Game theoretical models of this kind do not yield stable equilibria for all 
shapes of cost functions. Models of monopolistic competition set aside the explicit consideration of competitors’ 
activities. Therefore a treatment of the interactions on the market is possible without using concepts of game theory. 
Along with this simplification goes the disadvantage of not being able to obtain provable market equilibria. This could 
be a reason why markets under monopolistic competition have been modelled by means of agent based simulat ion 
only seldomly. The most recent model is of Catullo (2013). He examines companies of a generic industry sector in a 
spatial setting with two regions. Companies can decide on prices, capacity, research and export in the other region by 
means of reinforcement learning. If suppliers have spent their initial endowments without making profit, they leave 
the market. In each iteration a new supplier enters the market. Number, size and research efforts of companies are 
endogenous to the model. However, the q-learning algorithm that is applied assumes complete independence of agents 
from each other. This neglects the fact that single suppliers in monopolistic competition indeed consider the actions 
of competitors on the market. They believe that the demand for the good they offer depends on the ratio of its price to 
an aggregate market price index. 
Monopolistic competition is particularly interesting for transport economical considerations. This is because in this 
market form the emphasis of the modeler can be put on entries and exits of suppliers and the emergence of spatial 
characteristics of the supply side from agent interactions that are endogenous to the model. As Carrillo and Liedtke 
(2013) showed for the example of intermodal container terminals, dynamic equilibria can be reached in a market under 
monopolistic competition. As far as market simulation is concerned, only one example of monopolistic competition 
in freight transport is known to the authors. The already mentioned market in the model of Baindur and Viegas (2011) 
has properties of monopolistic competition, such as the determination of market entries and exits by the model and 
preference for variety on the demand side. 
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3. A stylized transport market model 
A simple spatial setting is assumed in which the supply of business establishments in a city from shippers that are 
located in a suburb is considered (see Fig. 1.). Starting with some initial data and an adaption process as simple as 
possible, an outline is given how a market equilibrium could be reached. 
 
Fig. 1. Spatial setting of the transport market 
3.1. The demand side of the transport market 
Freight transport is an activity that is derived from trade relationships between buyers and sellers of goods. Unless 
they are one-off businesses, such relationships last for a certain period of time and encompass an overall quantity of 
goods that are exchanged. During their runtime such frame contracts cause more or less regular transport movements 
between shippers and recipients. In most cases the time span of the frame contract as well as the overall quantity of 
goods shipped requires the formation of several single shipments. The details of shipping have to be agreed upon by 
shipper and recipient. The formation of these relationships and their details are not considered here.  
One of the contractual parties is in charge of organizing the transport of the shipments. In reality, the requirements 
of the shipper and the recipient have to be met, hence decisions on transport are usually drawn together or the 
requirements of the other party serve as restrictions for the party in charge. From now on, shippers are assumed to 
represent the customers on the market for freight transport services. 
Transports are performed by third party companies that solicit orders from various customers. As there exist many 
shippers and several transport companies that look for business partners on their own initiative, the search for freight 
space respective cargo can be seen to take place on a market. The way how consumers act on a market depends on 
their preferences, their endowment with resources and the supply they face. Similar things hold for the supply side 
which adjusts behavior given own constraints, competition and demand.  
This situation will be addressed in the model. In the problem at hand, a market under monopolistic competition 
will be modeled. Monopolistic competition can be seen as a limit case of oligopoly, where every supplier believes to 
have some market power left. This results from the perception of shippers that distinguish between different carriers 
according to service characteristics or the location of the carrier’s business seat. Transport companies that offer the 
same service for the same price are therefore seen to be slightly different from each other. Shippers do not only notice 
this difference, but also exhibit a certain preference for variety of transport companies to choose from. Of the various 
models developed on this market form, the one of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) will be taken as a base. In the original 
929 Tilman Matteis et al. /  Transportation Research Procedia  12 ( 2016 )  925 – 937 
work, preference for variety was modeled by means of a CES utility function. In the present example this is not 
possible, as a shipment can only be handed over to exactly one carrier. Therefore, shippers ask several carriers for 
prices and decide according to a logit model. As Anderson et. al. (1992) showed, such a choice is similar to a consumer 
that decides according to a CES utility function in the case when only one item of a certain good has to be consumed. 
Regarding the demand side, the trade relationships are given and fixed. This means that the quantities of goods and 
the transport distances are constant and especially independent of transport prices. Such an assumption restricts the 
scope of the model to short- to medium term considerations. Nevertheless it does not limit the explanatory power of 
the model, as in reality most transports from and to urban areas serve business sectors such as retail or crafts that do 
not change their demand with altered trade patterns (c.f. Schoemaker et. al. (2006)). 
Expressed more formally, the demand side consists of a set of shippers which is indexed by ݅. Each shipper ݅ can 
ship various flows that are gathered in the set  ܨ௜ . Each flow ݂ of a certain shipper has a strength of ௜ܳ௙  and is 
subdivided in shipments ݏ௜௙ with equal quantity ݍ௦೔೑ . It holds σ ݍ௦೔೑ ൌ ܳ௜௙௦೔೑א௙ . In the following, only the shipments 
ݏ௜௙ and their sizes ݍ௦೔೑   will be of interest. For each shipment, offers are requested from several transport companies 
that are also called suppliers or carriers. Note that for the sake of simplicity an aggregation of shipments from different 
flows that originate from the same shipper is not done. 
Shippers choose a carrier to whom they will hand over their shipments. For each single shipment ݏ௜௙this choice is 
made according to a multinomial logit model. The probability with which shipper ݅ chooses carrier ݆ for his flow ݂is:    
ܲ൫ݏ௜௙൯௝ ൌ 
݁ݔ݌ቆߙ ௜ܸ௙ ൬݌௝ ቀݍ௦೔೑ቁ൰ቇ
σ ݁ݔ݌ቆߙ ௜ܸ௙ ൬݌௞ ቀݍ௦೔೑ቁ൰ቇ௞א஼௛೔೑
 ሺͳሻ 
        
Despite its obvious shape, equation (1) requires some explanation. Choices are made depending on the utility 
function ௜ܸ௙ ൬݌௝ ቀݍ௦೔೑ቁ൰. This function allows all shippers a choice according to a model with the same parameter ߙ. 
As in the less-than-truckload (LTL) segment, shipment sizes can vary within a wide range, a single parameter ߙ 
estimated from a sample drawn from all shipments in a certain lane would not lead to sound results. This is due to the 
price differences of shipments that can have different orders of magnitude. For small shipments, the choice decision 
would be completely random, whereas for large shipments, the cheapest carrier would be chosen almost certainly.    
To arrive at a behavioral sound model, parameter values for various categories of shipment sizes had to be estimated. 
In the absence of such data, an assumption that can be justified is that shippers react uniformly on relative price 
differences. The indirect utility function in equation (1) thus scales all prices in the choice set, so that ௜ܸ௙ ൬݌௝ ቀݍ௦೔೑ቁ൰ ൌ
௣ೕቀ௤ೞ೔೑ቁ
௣೘೔೙ቀ௤ೞ೔೑ቁ
with ݌௠௜௡ ቀݍ௦೔೑ቁ being the lowest price in the choice set ܥ݄௜௙Ǥ 
 
A choice of the carrier in charge could also be modeled by means of a master equation, as for example suggested 
by Carrillo (2011). In such a model, shippers switch between carriers according to a transition function. In the simplest 
case of such a function, transition probabilities between the present and all other available carriers also have the type 
of a multinomial logit function (c.f. Helbing (2010)). 
The second fact worth to be mentioned in connection with equation (1) is the importance of the choice set ܥ݄௜௙. 
Provided that there are many shippers on a market, a single one of them does not have enough power for negotiating 
prices with any of the carriers. Thus the choice set is the only thing that can be decided upon by the shipper given that 
the shipment size  ݍ௦೔೑  was already determined together with the recipient of the concerned flow ݂. The size of the 
choice set can be determined using the expected benefit that the shipper can gain and that reads: 
 
ܧ ቀ ஼ܹ௛೔೑ቁ ൌ
ͳ
ߙ  ෍ ݁ݔ݌ቆߙ ௜ܸ௙ ൬݌௞ ቀݍ௦೔೑ቁ൰ቇ
௞א஼௛೔೑
 ሺʹሻ 
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The value of equation (2) reflects the expectation of the maximum value that ௜ܸ௙ ൬݌௞ ቀݍ௦೔೑ቁ൰ can attain. In models 
that incorporate discrete choice into industrial organization (e.g. Anderson et. al. (1992)) equation (2) was used for 
forming choice sets as its value is strictly increasing in the cardinality หܥ݄௜௙ห of the choice set. Such increases in 
welfare are often contrasted with prices and search costs. In the present case, the latter is not possible for two reasons. 
First equation (2) is deduced from equation (1) and thus prices are again relative. These relative prices also allow 
equation (2) to have a reasonable shape if real figures are entered. Taking absolute prices of shipments with a large 
spread in sizes, results would be misleading with just one estimated parameter ߙ at hand for all shipments in the 
market. For small shipments ܧ ቀ ஼ܹ௛೔೑ቁ could become negative only after the addition of a second or third element to 
ܥ݄௜௙ whereas for large shipments the effect of additional choice set members would be negligible.  
Thus the absolute value of ܧ ቀ ஼ܹ௛೔೑ቁ in equation (2) has not the meaning that allows it to contrast it with some search 
cost expression. However, differences between ܧ ቀ ஼ܹ௛೔೑ቁ and ܧ ቀ ஼ܹ௛೔೑׫ೖᇲቁ with ݇
ᇱ being an additional carrier can 
be used to determine desired sizes of the choice set.  
 
οܧ ቀ ஼ܹ௛೔೑ቁ ൌ ܧ ቀ ஼ܹ௛೔೑ቁ െ ܧ ቀ ஼ܹ௛೔೑׫ೖᇲቁሺ͵ሻ  
 
states the relative increase of welfare due to an increase in the variety to choose from. As the value of equation (3) 
is concave, a threshold value ߜாቀௐ಴೓೔೑ቁcan be defined. If οܧ ቀ ஼ܹ௛೔೑ቁ ൏ ߜாቀௐ಴೓೔೑ቁ for any increase of the cardinality 
of the choice set, the shipper can be considered as satisfied with the number of shippers at hand.  
Choosing relative prices in equations (1) to (3) entails the same preference for variety for all shippers in the market. 
This assumption can be contested. If there were more detailed data at hand, group specific parameter values of ߙ could 
be estimated.  
3.2. The supply side of the transport market 
In the transport market at hand, there is a set of carriers denoted by ܯ and indexed by ݆. Carriers are endowed with 
production equipment that allows them to consolidate shipments that are not suitable to be transported directly in a 
single vehicle from the shipper to the recipient. For this purpose, they maintain hub facilities from which pickup and 
delivery tours as well as main runs between two hubs start. Each carrier ݆ maintains a set ܪ௝of hubs indexed with ݈. 
Each hub ௝݄௟ is limited in the volume of freight it can handle by its capacity ܿܽ݌൫ ௝݄௟൯. For the sake of simplicity, it is 
assumed that all hubs of all suppliers have the same capacity ܿܽ݌൫ ௝݄௟൯ ൌ ܿܽ݌ǡ ׊ ௝݄௟ א ܪ௝ǡ ׊݆Ԗ. Within or around 
each hub, several activities are defined: 
x Tours in which shipments are collected from shippers in the catchment area of the hub (in the equations below 
referred to as “collect”). 
x Tours in which shipments are distributed to recipients in the catchment area of the hub (referred to as 
“distribute”). 
x Vehicle trips to other hubs in which shipments are sent in order to further distribute them to their recipients from 
there (referred to as “main run”). 
x Reloading of shipments between two of the above mentioned tours (referred to as “reload”). 
These activities can be combined in the following sequences: 
x Collect – reload – distribute 
x Collect – reload – main run 
x Reload – distribute 
 
931 Tilman Matteis et al. /  Transportation Research Procedia  12 ( 2016 )  925 – 937 
Taking a closer look at these chains of activities, shows that the main run that connects two hubs is tied to the hub 
of origin. Moreover it shows that a two stop strategy is pursued unless both the shipper and the recipient are located 
in the catchment area of the same hub.  
Selecting the start and end hub by taking the closest one to the shipper respective recipient together with the two 
stop strategy simplifies the path through the logistic network of the transport company. Along with the selection of 
the hubs, a capacity check is performed. If the shipment for which an offer is requested increases the payload of one 
of the involved hubs over the capacity limit, no offer is made. With the shipment being feasible for acceptance in the 
network and its path known, prices can be assigned to it. Prices depend on the weight of the shipment ݍ௦೔೑  , and the 
effort caused for transportation. To the shipper, prices have the shape ݌௛ೕ೚௛ೕ೏ ቀݍ௦೔೑ቁ. With ௝݄௢ being the hub of origin 
and ௝݄ௗthe hub of destination. This means that for all shipments on the same path the price is set by the same rule that 
only depends on the weight of the shipment. Prices can thus be looked up by the carrier from a tariff table.  
In a market under monopolistic competition, suppliers seek to maximize their profit. Moreover they pretend that 
they can set the price for their service more or less independently from the other suppliers in the market as they have 
monopolistic power to a certain extent. Here, the consumer choice modelled by the logit model comes into effect. 
Shippers do not only choose according to the price, the decision is rather blurred by the parameter ߙ in equation (1). 
The fuzziness brought into the decision thereby can be as resulting from the unique features of the carrier that his 
customers know and appreciate but that are hidden to the outside observer. Prices that allow for profits attract other 
carriers that enter the market in hope for also gaining a share of the willingness to pay. This movement into the market 
ends in a state where all active suppliers only break even and make no profit.  
The model anticipates this state and thus the suppliers charge prices that correspond to their expected marginal 
costs. Cost components in the model correspond to the activities in and between the hub facilities as outlined above. 
Every additional shipment is charged for the costs that the activities necessary to handle it cause. In this sense, an 
activity based costing scheme is applied (see Baykasoglu and Kaplanoglu (2008)). As the acceptance of a shipment 
also has an effect on the costs for the orders already at hand, the activity based costs can be seen as the marginal costs 
for the whole set of orders. 
 
The cost components for a single shipment ݏ௜௙ are: 
x Loading and unloading of shipments at the shippers or recipients premises: 
ܿ௛௔௡ௗ௟௘ ቀݍ௦೔೑ቁሺͶሻ        
With ܿ௛௔௡ௗ௟௘ ቀݍ௦೔೑ቁ an arbitrary function stating the itemized costs for loading a shipment of size ݍ௜௦ on or from a 
vehicle. 
 
x Reloading a shipment between two transport legs in a hub: 
ܿ௥௘௟௢௔ௗ ቀݍ௦೔೑ቁ ൌ ʹ ή ܿ௛௔௡ௗ௟௘ ቀݍ௦೔೑ቁ ൅
௖೑೔ೣǡ೓ೕ೗
σ ௤ೞೖ೑ೞೖ೑אೄ೓ೕ೗
ݍ௦೔೑ሺͷሻ        
With ܵ௛ೕ೗ the set of all shipments running through hub ௝݄௟. The second summand in equation (5) assigns the fixed 
costs for running the hub to the single shipments. Costs and hence prices are depending on the payload of the hub 
and thus unknown to the supplier at the time of making an offer. This problem will occur at several cost components.  
x Collection and distribution of shipments in vehicle tours: 
ܿ௖௢௟௟௘௖௧ ቀݍ௦೔೑ቁ ൌ ௙ܿ௜௫௖௢௟௟௘௖௧ ቀݍ௦೔೑ቁ ൅ ܿ௔௣௣௥௢௔௖௛௖௢௟௟௘௖௧ ቀݍ௦೔೑ቁ ൅ ܿ௜௡௧௘௥௖௢௟௟௘௖௧ ቀݍ௦೔೑ቁ ሺ͸ሻ 
௙ܿ௜௫௖௢௟௟௘௖௧ ቀݍ௦೔೑ቁ ൌ ܧ ቀݎ௖௢௟௟௘௖௧ǡ௛ೕ೗ቁ ή ௙ܿ௜௫ǡ௩௘௛೎೚೗೗೐೎೟ ή
௤ೞ೔೑
σ ௤ೞೖ೑ೞೖ೑אೄ೎೚೗೗೐೎೟ǡ೓ೕ೗
ሺ͹ሻ   
ܿ௔௣௣௥௢௔௖௛௖௢௟௟௘௖௧ ቀݍ௦೔೑ቁ ൌ ܧ ቀݎ௖௢௟௟௘௖௧ǡ௛ೕ೗ቁ ή ܧ ቀ݀௔௣௣௥௢௔௖௛ǡ௖௢௟௟௘௖௧ǡ௛ೕ೗ቁ ή ܿௗ௜௦௧ǡ௩௘௛೎೚೗೗೐೎೟ ή ൭
ݍ௦೔೑
σ ݍ௦ೖ೑௦ೖ೑אௌ೎೚೗೗೐೎೟ǡ೓ೕ೗
൱ ሺͺሻ 
ܿ௜௡௧௘௥௖௢௟௟௘௖௧ ቀݍ௦೔೑ቁ ൌ 
ܧ ቀݎ௖௢௟௟௘௖௧ǡ௛ೕ೗ቁ ή ܧ ቀ݀௜௡௧௘௥ǡ௖௢௟௟௘௖௧ǡ௛ೕ೗ቁ ή ܿௗ௜௦௧ǡ௩௘௛೎೚೗೗೐೎೟
ܧ ቀቚܵ௖௢௟௟௘௖௧ǡ௛ೕ೗ቚቁ
 ሺͻሻ 
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Equations (6) to (9) hold for both collection and distribution runs. In the latter case, the subscript  ܿ݋݈݈݁ܿݐ is simply 
replaced by the subscript ݀݅ݏݐݎܾ݅ݑݐ݁. The costs are composed of fixed vehicle costs that are assigned to each 
shipment according to its share of the payload. ܵ௖௢௟௟௘௖௧ǡ௛ೕ೗is the set of all shipments collected at the corresponding 
hub in the observed period. The same holds for the trips between the hub and the first respective last customer of 
the tour. This distance is denoted by its expected value ܧ ቀ݀௔௣௣௥௢௔௖௛ǡ௖௢௟௟௘௖௧ǡ௛ೕ೗ቁ. To account for the case of vehicles 
that are only filled to a small part, the assignment is made over all runs from the hub in the observed period. The 
expected number of collection tours is ܧ ቀݎ௖௢௟௟௘௖௧ǡ௛ೕ೗ቁ. 
x Main run between two hubs: 
ܿ௠௔௜௡௥௨௡ǡ௛ೕ೚௛ೕ೏ ቀݍ௦೔೑ቁ ൌ ௙ܿ௜௫௠௔௜௡௥௨௡ǡ௛ೕ೚௛ೕ೏ ቀݍ௦೔೑ቁ ൅ ܿௗ௜௦௧௠௔௜௡௥௨௡ǡ௛ೕ೚௛ೕ೏ ቀݍ௦೔೑ቁሺͳͲሻ       
௙ܿ௜௫௠௔௜௡௥௨௡ǡ௛ೕ೚௛ೕ೏ ቀݍ௦೔೑ቁ ൌ ܧ ቀݎ௠௔௜௡௥௨௡ǡ௛ೕ೚௛ೕ೏ቁ ή ௙ܿ௜௫ǡ௩௘௛೘ೌ೔೙ೝೠ೙ ή
௤ೞ೔೑
σ ௤ೞೖ೑೜ೞೖ೑אೄ೘ೌ೔೙ೝೠ೙ǡ೓ೕ೚೓ೕ೏
ሺͳͳሻ   
ܿௗ௜௦௧௠௔௜௡௥௨௡ǡ௛ೕ೚௛ೕ೏ ቀݍ௦೔೑ቁ ൌ ܧ ቀݎ௠௔௜௡௥௨௡ǡ௛ೕ೚௛ೕ೏ቁܧ ቀ݀௠௔௜௡௥௨௡ǡ௛ೕ೚௛ೕ೏ቁ ܿௗ௜௦௧ǡ௩௘௛೘ೌ೔೙ೝೠ೙
ݍ௦೔೑
σ ݍ௦ೖ೑௤ೞೖ೑אௌ೘ೌ೔೙ೝೠ೙ǡ೓ೕ೚೓ೕ೏
ሺͳʹሻ 
 
The values ܧ ቀݎ௖௢௟௟௘௖௧ǡ௛ೕ೗ቁ , ܧ ቀ݀௔௣௣௥௢௔௖௛ǡ௖௢௟௟௘௖௧ǡ௛ೕ೗ቁ , ܧ ቀ݀௜௡௧௘௥ǡ௖௢௟௟௘௖௧ǡ௛ೕ೗ቁ , ܧ ቀݎ௠௔௜௡௥௨௡ǡ௛ೕ೚௛ೕ೏ቁ  and 
ܧ ቀ݀௠௔௜௡௥௨௡ǡ௛ೕ೚௛ೕ೏ቁhave to be calculated by solving instances of a vehicle routing problem with more or less 
restrictions.  
Several difficulties occur when trying to do this. First, numbers and distances of tours are depending on the number, 
location and shipment size of the customers as well as on the competition with other suppliers. The more suppliers are 
active in a region, the more sparsely are one’s own customers likely to be distributed and the longer the tours are likely 
to be. This leads to ever changing cost functions that make the determination of prices difficult. This is mainly due to 
the fact that resource utilizations like σ ݍ௦ೖ೑௦ೖ೑אௌ೎೚೗೗೐೎೟ǡ೓ೕ೗  or σ ݍ௦ೖ೑௤ೞೖ೑אௌ೘ೌ೔೙ೝೠ೙ǡ೓ೕ೚೓ೕ೏  are not known in advance and 
have to be deduced from former periods. Second, in every iteration two instances of a vehicle routing problem have 
to be solved for each hub, one for collection and one for distribution. In a market with a set ܯof suppliers, ʹσ หܪ௝ห௝אெ  
instances of such a problem have to be solved in each iteration. Furthermore, even if the paths taken on the main runs 
between two hubs remain unchanged, a bin packing problem has to be solved to determine the number of vehicles that 
is necessary to transport all shipments. 
In comparable situations, approximate solutions for the number and distance of tours have been used in the past. 
These solutions have in common that they regress these figures from samples of the customers (e.g. Figliozzi (2009)). 
In the present case, tour lengths are approximated by the expected values of the tour components. Route planning is 
only performed, if the concerned carrier has reason to believe that noticeable changes in the tour patterns happen. This 
can be the entry of a further carrier in the market, so that the relative density of customers decreases or a considerable 
change in the number or volume of the shipments that were handed over occurred.  
The number of vehicles that is needed is supposed to change more frequently than characteristics of vehicle tours 
do. Note that the capacity of a carrier is only fixed as far as the facilities are concerned. The number of vehicles, in 
contrast, is flexible. Otherwise a capacity check had to be performed for each shipment at the time an offer is requested. 
The number of vehicles needed for the main run, can be approximated if one assumes that the carrier has already 
gained experience to a certain extent. In this case, a linear regression is made (c.f. Figliozzi (2009)) with the scaling 
factor ߚ෨௠௔௜௡ known and constant: 
 
ܧ ቀݎ௠௔௜௡௥௨௡ǡ௛ೕ೚௛ೕ೏ቁ ൎ ቜߚ෨௠௔௜௡
σ ௤ೞ೔೑೜ೞ೔೑אೄ೘ೌ೔೙ೝೠ೙ǡ೓ೕ೚೓ೕ೏
௖௔௣ೡ೐೓೘ೌ೔೙ೝೠ೙
ቝሺͳ͵ሻ        
Equation (13) also holds for the number of vehicles necessary for collection and distribution, though with different 
subscripts. 
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3.3. Endogenous formation of the market supply 
As mentioned, the essential feature of monopolistic competition is the endogenous determination of the number of 
active suppliers. This number is obtained during the course of market interactions. From Fig. 3, it can be seen that the 
market interactions take place in rounds during which the carriers enter the scene one by one. The set of carriers in 
each iteration is divided into three different subsets: Incumbent carriers that have been active on the market already 
in previous rounds, a newcomer carrier that just entered the market at the beginning of the current market round and 
an observing carrier that decides whether to enter the market in the next round or not.  Between two subsequent entries, 
shippers ask the active carriers for offers and choose them according to the rule stated in equation (1). Thus, two 
nested loops of market iterations are necessary to determine the supply structure in the market. The iterations, in which 
a new carrier enters the market are denoted by the superscript ߱ (see also Fig.4.). Between two iterations ߱ and ߱ ൅
ͳ, demand distributes over the available carriers. This takes several market rounds that are denoted by the superscript 
ߥ ൌ ͳǡڮ ǡ ܰఠǤ During these market rounds, carriers adjust their costs and hence prices. The first carrier that enters the 
market in ߱ ൌ ͳ does not know much about the market. Being the first supplier, the assumption that his facilities will 
be used to capacity is reasonable. For all further cost components ௝ܿ௔
ఠୀଵఔୀଵ educated guesses are made. The subscriptܽ 
denotes the activity that serves as cost driver. Each carrier ݆ is endowed with a set ܣ௝ of activities that entail costs. In 
the course of the iterations cost components are updated according to an exponential smoothing, so that the costs after 
iterationߥ  are updated for the following market round: 
 
௝ܿ௔
ఠఔାଵ ൌ ߣ ௝ܿ௔ఠఔ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߣሻߣ ௝ܿ௔ఠఔିଵሺͳͶሻ   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Carriers enter the market one by one 
The iterations of the inner loop will stop, if the total number of transport orders that are handed over to the active 
carrier/s does not change beyond a small tolerance. This stop criterion is motivated by the by the variety in shipment 
sizes which makes changes in total utilization a criterion that can probably inhibit convergence of the market 
interactions. This criterion is also in line with the master equation model that was outlined in 3.1.  
The newcomer in iteration ߱ ൅ ͳ was the observer in iteration ߱. Thus he can reasonably be assumed to have 
examined the market to some extent. This can be seen in Fig. 3., where an observing carrier is placed in the top right         
corner. The observer from iteration ߱ enters the market in ߱ ൅ ͳ, if the newcomer in iteration was successful, i.e. he 
did not have to leave the market again. After having decided to enter the market, the newcomer charges the average 
price that the incumbent carriers did in iteration ܰఠ of loop ߱. More formal: 
݌௡௘௪ఠାଵଵ ൌ ݌ҧெഘఠே
ഘ ቀݍ௦೔೑ቁሺͳͷሻ   
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All incumbent carriers keep their prices at the same level that they had in iteration ܰఠof loop ߱. As mentioned, 
the decision of the observer to enter the market in the following round ߱ ൅ ͳ depends on the success of the newcomer 
in round ߱. Success depends on the choices of the shippers, who ask carriers for offers until οܧ ቀ ஼ܹ௛೔೑ቁ does not 
increase considerably anymore. Shippers distinguish between established carriers and the newcomer. Among the 
established carriers they ask the one that was in charge for the transport in the previous iteration and some arbitrarily 
selected others for an offer. If the choice set obtained by the offers from the established carriers is not large enough, 
the newcomer is also asked for an offer.  At the beginning of the interactions, capacities of carriers are small compared 
with total demand so that some shippers do not find any carrier with free capacity anymore. As the number of active 
carriers increases, the tendency to ask the newcomer decreases as more and more shippers are satisfied with the choice 
at hand.  As the carriers call cost based prices, the newcomer will become unattractive at some point, as he is too 
expensive because of the lower total utilization. If his utilization undercuts a threshold value ܳ௧௠௜௡ he leaves the 
market again. The observer sees this and also decides not to enter the market, a decision that ends the interactions. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Iterations of shippers and carriers in detail 
Charging cost covering prices and increasing the number of carriers sequentially entails an increase in prices. This 
is on first sight contradicting to economic concepts as prices usually are supposed do decrease when further suppliers 
are entering the market. However, the final price ݌௧ஐே
ಈ ቀݍ௦೔೑ቁ  for any shipment can be seen as a measure of 
willingness to pay of the shippers. This price reflects the amount that shippers want to spend on transport services 
given the choice set at hand. Thus the preference for variety is already factored in. This means that the first active 
carrier could charge a price higher than ݌௧ୀଵனୀଵ஝ ቀݍ௦೔೑ቁ as he has monopolistic power but lower than ݌௧ஐே
ಈ ቀݍ௦೔೑ቁ as 
there is no variety from which the shippers can profit.  
This has implications for policy measures, that usually are positioned on the level of the traffic operations, and 
their assessment. Given a market under monopolistic competition, the level of supply can be determined for which 
the shippers are willing to pay. After having implemented the policy measure, it can be tested if adaptations of supply 
can prevent their results from reaching the shippers whose behavior is the actual target.  
3.4. Extension to multiple regions 
This setting can be extended to multiple regions. In this case, two further aspects have to be addressed.  
 
1.) Traffic now takes place in both directions. 
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2.) Multiple lanes can start and end at each hub facility. 
 
When shipments are travelling in both directions, imbalanced flows are likely to occur. This can have implications 
on the number of vehicles that have to be held available in both regions. It is determined by the stronger  one of the 
two flows. If in a lane that connects two regions ݋ and ݀ the flow from ݋ to ݀ is the stronger one, the number of 
vehicles needed in the two regions is ܧ ቀݎ௖௢௟௟௘௖௧௛ೕ೚ቁ and ܧ ቀݎௗ௜௦௧௥௜௕௨௧௘௛ೕ೏ቁ. This results from the assumption that the 
shipments are collected and distributed in both regions at the same time. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that 
there is only one vehicle type (indexed byݒ݄݁ in equation 16) in use. 
The assignment of collection and distribution costs thus changes in comparison with equation (6). For the shipments 
from  ݋ to ݀ the share of fixed costs is: 
௙ܿ௜௫௖௢௟௟௘௖௧௛ೕ೚ ቀݍ௦೔೑ቁ ൌ ௙ܿ௜௫ǡ௩௘௛ ή
ʹ ή ቂܧ ቀݎ௖௢௟௟௘௖௧௛ೕ೚ቁ െ ܧ ቀݎௗ௜௦௧௥௜௕௨௧௘௛ೕ೚ቁቃ ൅ ܧ ቀݎௗ௜௦௧௥௜௕௨௧௘௛ೕ೚ቁ
ʹ ή ܧ ቀݎ௖௢௟௟௘௖௧௛ೕ೚ቁ
ሺͳ͸ሻ 
and for the opposite direction: 
 
௙ܿ௜௫ௗ௜௦௧௥௜௕௨௧௘௛ೕ೚ ቀݍ௦೔೑ቁ ൌ ௙ܿ௜௫ǡ௩௘௛ ή
ܧ ቀݎௗ௜௦௧௥௜௕௨௧௘௛ೕ೚ቁ
ʹ ή ܧ ቀݎ௖௢௟௟௘௖௧௛ೕ೚ቁ
ሺͳ͹ሻ 
For the allocation of fixed costs in facility ݄௧ௗ the same allocation formulas hold so that the flow in the stronger 
direction has to cover the full fixed costs for the additional vehicles that are needed.  
For the main run it is assumed that the two regions ݋ and ݀ are too far apart so that only the main run in one 
direction can be performed within the given time window. Such a time window could for example be the result from 
the requirement for overnight delivery. Thus the number of vehicles needed for the main run is ʹ ή ܧ ቀݎ௠௔௜௡௥௨௡ǡ௛ೕ೚௛ೕ೏ቁ 
that is twice the number of vehicles needed to serve the stronger flow. Cost allocation is the same than in equations 
(16) and (17).  
If one assumes that shipments are collected at the same time in both regions (e.g. in the late afternoon or early 
evening) and distributed some hours later (for example in the case of overnight delivery), the capacities of hub facilities 
do not have to be extended as the flows of each direction use space that would otherwise be idle. Nevertheless, 
additional staff has to be hired for a second shift in each of the facilities, so that ௙ܿ௜௫ǡ௛ೕ೗ from equation (5) increases 
for every hub facility. Costs are assigned to each direction based on the share of overall weight. 
The behavior of shippers in a setting with multiple regions does not change remarkably. Despite the complete 
spatial setting, they only choose carriers from the region in which they are located. This is necessary to retain the 
notion of a lane as a market. All other things remain the same, especially the rules for the formation of the choice set.  
Carriers can now serve lanes between all pairs of regions. As before, the lanes start and end in hub facilities. Each 
carrier maintains at most one hub ௝݄௟ in each region ݈ at which all lanes start and end. If only one lane starts and ends 
in ௝݄௟, its capacity is ܿܽ݌, as in the case with only two regions. For each additional lane, a capacity increment οܿܽ݌ is 
added that causes fixed costs ௙ܿ௜௫ο௖௔௣ǡ௛ೕ೗.  Cost allocation in the case of multiple regions considers again fixed hub 
costs and the number of vehicles that are necessary for collection and distribution. In the case of fixed hub costs each 
lane has to cover ௙ܿ௜௫ο௖௔௣ǡ௛ೕ೗. Assignment to both lanes is also done according to the weight share.  
The number of vehicles that are needed for collection and distribution is determined by the sum of the stronger 
flows of all lanes that are incident to a hub facility. Every lane then has to cover the costs that correspond to their 
weight share. Within each lane, costs are assigned again according to equations (16) and (17).    
Looking at both sides of the market, it can now be said that the lanes can be seen as own market segments of which 
some are connected by common cost functions for collection and distribution tours. This has implications on the entry 
of new carriers, which now happens on the basis of single lanes. As before, there are again established carriers, the 
newcomer and an observer present in each iteration ߱ (see Fig. 4.). In ߱ ൌ ͳ the first carrier enters all lanes. During 
the following iterations of ߱ later entrants also enter all lanes until the entry on the lane with the lowest demand or 
preference for variety is not successful anymore. In this case, the newcomer only leaves this lane again and the 
observer only enters the remaining lanes. The lane is now seen to be closed for further entries by the carriers. This 
goes on until all lanes are closed.  
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Fig. 4. Sequential entry of carriers in multiple lanes 
4. Conclusions 
A framework on how to incorporate market interactions that allow for the explanation of supply structures in urban 
freight transport has been set up. Supply and demand agents have some capabilities to act autonomously. When 
applying the model to the market segment of general cargo, spatial meso structures of transport supply could be 
derived. First, the base scenario in situations where the transport market consists of unregulated private companies 
can be described. If a policy measure is applied that is reflected in a change of the cost structure of transport companies, 
their number and capacity utilization will change. Thus, a model in which fiscal effects of policy measures not only 
are handed on to the shippers but in which also the supply structure changes in a way that is visible to the observer, 
can be set up. 
The model uses existing concepts from transport economy and transport modeling and combines them to gain a 
closed model of a transport market with emergence phenomena. Some aspects that are less relevant are addressed by 
approximation, such as the characteristics of vehicle tours. Emergence results on the level of aggregated demand to 
which the single shippers contribute according to their preferences. As single shippers are assumed to send small 
shipments compared to the size of a vehicle, transport companies base their decision to enter or leave them market 
only on aggregate demand figures. This procedure aims for the maximization of the overall welfare on the market, 
although single shippers have to accept welfare losses. 
However, previous knowledge on the area of operation and the demand there are assumed on the side of the 
transport companies in order to shorten calculation time and keep the model simple. A gradual decrease in the use of 
such assumptions in favor of more autonomy of the agents would add to the touch of the model with reality. Also, 
steps have to be taken towards an empirical foundation of the model, so that it can be applied to a real urban scenario. 
Demand representations of some urban areas have been developed in the past (e.g. Wisetjindawat et. al. (2007), Gentile 
and Vigo (2013)). However, data on the supply side in the transport market is still scarce and the various competing 
companies are expected to be very heterogeneous.  
Further extensions are the application in a model covering a seamless world. Moreover, monopolistic competition 
actually incorporates profit maximization on the side of the suppliers. This quest for profit takes place in an 
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environment where each supplier does not have a direct opponent nor is completely independent from others. Thus 
suitable methods have to be found that enable the carriers with the capability to explore their environment and react 
to actions of the collective of competitors without addressing single opponents.          
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